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Abstract
Securityisafundamentalpreconditionfortheacceptanceofmobileagent
systems. In this paper we discuss protocols to improve agent security by dis-
tributing critical data and operations on mutually supporting agents which
migrate in disjunct host domains. In order to attack agents, hosts must form
coalitions. Proper selection of itineraries can minimize the risk of such coali-
tions being formed.
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1 Introduction
“It is difﬁcult to exaggerate the value and importance of security in an itinerant
agent environment. While the availability of strong security features would not
make itinerant agents immediately appealing, the absence of security would cer-
tainly make itinerant agents very unattractive” [2]. Unfortunately, some security
issues in itinerant or mobile agent systems are hard to solve. A prominent example
is the problem of malicious hosts which receives increasing attention. The under-
lying problem stems from the fact that mobile agents are executed in the security
domain of the agent server which provides the agent’s runtime environment.
1The most conservative approach is to assume that each host on a mobile agent’s
itinerary is hostile and willing to collaborate with other malicious hosts on the
agent’s route. This assumption is as realistic as the assumption that hosts can be
generally trusted, though. A more reasonable assumption is probably the follow-
ing:
Given a particular mobile agent, at any point in time, a certain percent-
age of hosts might be malicious.
Not all malicious hosts are willing to collaborate with other hosts in
attacking a mobile agent.
The percentage of malicious hosts likely depends on the gain which can be ex-
pected from successfully attacking mobile agents weighted against the costs of
mounting the attack as well as the risk of detection and the consequences of be-
ing detected. Of course, collaboration yields more power but it also requires close
coordination and increases the danger of leaks which might lead to disclosure.
2 Related Work
A number of approaches are investigated in order to protect mobile agents against
malicious hosts. Many of the current proposals deal with the a–posteriori recogni-
tion of tampering and the identiﬁcation of the culprit.
Vigna proposes a scheme which allows to identify a host that tampered with an
agent [8] based on tracing. The protocol requires hosts to commit to execution
traces of agents being run by it. One of the drawbacks of this protocol is the size
of traces which must be stored and veriﬁed.
Meadows proposes to lay out baits called “protection objects” in order to de-
tect tampering on mobile agents [3]. This approach is criticized by Sander and
Tschudin due to a “lack of cryptographic strength” [7]. In the very same paper
both authors promise to shake at the widespread belief that certain operations such
as digitally signing a document off–line in a secure way cannot be performed by a
mobile agent on a malicious host [7]. The proposed solution is based on function
hiding via homomorphic encryption schemes. An in–depth analysis and discussion
of this approach remains to be done, though.
Furthermore code obfuscation is investigated as a possible means to protect agents
against analysis and manipulation by malicious hosts. Trusted hardware envi-
ronments or secure coprocessors are sometimes considered as an alternative for
2software–only approaches with regard to protecting agents against malicious hosts.
This approach is taken for instance in the Sanctuary project [1].
Yee describes an approach using two agents which is illustrated using the airfare
booking agent scenario which is frequently used to discuss mobile agent security
related problems [1]. The protocol described requires a ﬁxed itinerary for both
agents, tolerates at most one malicious host and only “provided a solution for a
special case”, though. Nevertheless we believe that using cooperating agents has
merit for improving the security of mobile agent applications in the face of mali-
cious hosts.
3 White, Gray and Red Hosts
For ease of discussion we assume three categories of hosts each labeled with a
color. Given a particular mobile agent, a white host is completely trusted. Pre-
sumably there is at most one host shining in bright white – the one of the agent’s
owner, since it is the one which is controlled and operated exclusively by him.
Hosts which are not completely trusted and thus might become malicious are gray.
Those hosts which might collaborate with at least one other host in an attack on the
mobile agent are red.
White hosts are extremely rare, and demanding that a white host is available to a
mobile agent would limit the ﬂexibility of the mobile agent model. After all, the
only white host might be a laptop which needs to be disconnected while the agent
roams the network. The agent’s world hence consists basically of gray hosts as
well as a number of potential red ones.
Various hosts should be gray for most agents e. g. those of the employer’s com-
pany, universities, and nonproﬁt organizations, in particular those which have a
dedication towards privacy and security. Aggressive red hosts might attack those
networks in order to turn gray hosts into involuntary red ones; however this carries
considerable risk for the attacker.
The security of mobile agents against attacks by malicious hosts can be improved
by distributing critical operations of a mobile agent between two cooperating
agents, each of which operates in one of two disjunct nonempty sets of hosts Ha
and Hb which hold the following condition C:
No red host of either set is willing to cooperate with a red host of the
other set.
3Note that red hosts in the same set might still cooperate in attacking the agent, and
gray hosts might still try to attack an agent on their own.
The general idea is to do perform critical tasks such as the authorization of negoti-
ations between a host and an agent in the other (cooperating) agent and to split or
secretly share data between agents which might be stolen by a single host. In the
remaining sections we illustrate the idea by giving example protocols. For those
protocols to work we need to make two additional assumptions:
 hosts provide an authenticated communication channel to the two cooperat-
ing agents
 the authenticated identity of the remote host, the authenticated identity of the
host the agent came from as well as the local host’s identity are provided to
the hosted agent
As Yee already pointed out “if an agent is running on an honest server, both these
answers (for the peer identity and the local host’s identity) will be correct:::” [1].
In our case we assume that a gray host is honest with respect to providing the three
identities mentioned above as long as it does not proﬁt from lying.
4 Tracing Loose Routes
A simple yet effective attack on a mobile agent is for a malicious host not to let
the agent migrate to the servers of competitors. This particularly affects mobile
agents with loose itineraries in comparison to agents whose itineraries are deﬁned
a–priori, because deviations from a ﬁxed itinerary are easier to spot and prove.
We would like to record the actual loose route taken by an agent without any possi-
bility of manipulation by the hosts on its route. Providing C, the following protocol
for two cooperating agents should have the desired property. Each agent b records
and veriﬁes the route of its cooperating agent a as follows:
Deﬁnition: Let hi2Ha be the ith host being visited by agent a and let id(hi) be the
identity of host hi. Let previ be agent a’s idea of the identity id(hi 1) of its
previous hop. i shall denote the identity of the next hop agent a wants to take
while being on host hi. The agents’ routes end at their origin, that is hn=h0
for a route with n hops.
4Initialization: Let h0 be the origin of agents a and b. h0 has to be a white host
with respect to a and b. For agents a and b, 0 is set to the ﬁrst hop of their
respective itineraries. Both agents are subsequently sent to their ﬁrst hops.
Step i;i 2 f1;:::;ng: Agent a sends the next hop i and the previous hop previ
to agent b over the authenticated channel; Agent b thus also learns id(hi).
Agent b veriﬁes that id(hi)=i-1^previ=id(hi 1) and appends i to the stored
route.
Securityoftheprotocol: Itisstraightforwardtoseethatifhosthi forwardsagenta
to a host hi+1 with id(hi+1)6=i then host hi+1 must either successfully masquerade
as the host with id i or it has to deny communication between the cooperating
agents. On the other hand, if host hi+1 permits the communication and properly
authenticates itself (in other words, hi+1 is honest regarding the protocol) then
agent b discovers that host hi sent agent a to the wrong destination.
If id(hi+1)6=i then host hi+1 cannot put agent a back on its route by sending a to
the host with identity i because agent b recorded id(hi) as previ+1. As a matter of
consequence, hi+1 must either be honest (identifying hi as a cheater in the process)
or hi+1 has to collaborate with hi in putting the agent back on its expected route.
The last case is equivalent to hi sharing a copy of some known digital data with
another party – hardly something which can be prevented or detected at all.
A malicious host hi+1 might incriminate a honest host hi by claiming to have re-
ceived agent a from some other host h’, hence implicating that hi sent a to h’ in-
stead of the host with identity i=id(hi+1). The protocol is not able to decide which
one of the two hosts is the culprit. However, if hi+1 really received agent a from h’
then hi+1 should be able to produce a copy of a which is signed by h’ given some
additional agent protection mechanisms are implemented (see [4]).
The protocol has some drawbacks, though. Firstly, setting up the authenticated
communication channel for each migration is a costly operation. Secondly, if agent
a is killed, one of two hosts might be responsible and the protocol cannot decide
which one. In addition to that, some host hi+1 might take two agents a1 and a2
both being received by the same host hi and switch the recording of the route of
a1 to agent b2 and vice versa. The protocol must be enhanced to cope with this
situation.
55 Discussion and Conclusions
It must be ensured with reasonable conﬁdence that agents a and b never enter the
same set of hosts with regard to C. Hence the approach taken in this paper should
be complemented by results from research in agent routing policies such as the one
indicated by Swarup [6]. Hosts which do not want to forward agents to the servers
of certain competitors might still do so. However, the itinerary of the cooperating
agent will always show this fact.
Providing C, cooperating agents also provide an approach to tackle security prob-
lems of other critical operations such as payment authorization. Payment protocols
such as Chaum’s digital electronic cash protocol (as described e. g. in [5]) can in
principle be adapted to work with two mutually cooperating agents. The protocol
ensures detection of double spending with cheater identiﬁcation.
The owner of the agents prepares a money order m as described in [5]. The identity
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where E is a suitable encryption function and H is a strong cryptographic one–way
hash function. The money order as well as the keys are secretly shared between
agents a and b. If a now wants to purchase goods from host hi then a ﬁrst sends an
offer which is signed by hi to b. Agent b veriﬁes that the signature is valid and hi’s
identity (as determined by the authenticated communication channel) is the one
given in the according public key certiﬁcate. Agent b goes on to check whether the
offer is acceptable and ﬁnally decides whether payment should be made.
If the decision is positive, b stores the offer, requests the host’s selector string,
transfers its share of m, and opens the selected halves of the identity strings by
sending the appropriate key shares.
Host hi reconstructs the money order m, veriﬁes the bank’s signature and makes
sure that agent b properly opened the selected halves of the identity strings. The
protocol goes on as described in [5].
Clearly, host hi cannot manipulate the payment decision without cooperation from
b’s host. Neither of the hosts involved can steal the money order without the co-
operation of the other. However, any two hosts may proﬁt from a joint attack on
the cooperating agents by sharing the additional wealth gained from defrauding the
agents compared to the proﬁt gained from honest behavior. Therefor the itineraries
of both agents must be chosen with great care in order to assure C with reasonable
6conﬁdence. Security can be improved by additional measures [4] which ensure that
payment can only be made by b while being on particular hosts.
In summary, protocols based on assumption C have merit since they are less sus-
ceptible to attacks by coalitions of hosts than single agents. C is a generalization
of the trusted third party concept which is less restrictive and easier to meet.
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